Exporters, engineers, and blue-collarworkers by Brambilla, Irene et al.
Exporters, Engineers, and Blue-collar Workers
Irene Brambilla, Daniel Lederman, and Guido Porto
This article investigates differences in the composition of employment between export-
ing and nonexporting firms. In particular, it asks whether exporting firms hire more
engineers relative to blue-collar workers than nonexporting firms. In a stylized partial-
equilibrium model, firms produce goods of varying quality and exporters tend to
produce higher quality goods, which are intensive in engineers relative to blue-collar
workers. Firms are heterogeneous and more productive firms become exporters and
have a higher demand for engineers. The article provides causal evidence in support of
these theories using the Chilean Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual
census of manufacturing firms. The results from an instrumental variable estimator
suggest that Chilean exporters indeed utilize a higher share of engineers over blue-collar
workers. JEL Codes: F13, F14
There is widespread evidence of both a wage and an employment premium in ex-
porting vis-a`-vis nonexporting firms (Bernard and Jensen 1999; Bernard et al.
2007). This article investigates differences the composition of employment of ex-
porting firms. In particular, it asks whether exporting firms hire more engineers
relative to blue-collar workers than nonexporting firms. This can happen
because firms produce goods of varying quality and exporters tend to produce
higher quality goods. As in the literature, more productive firms become export-
ers (Melitz 2003). In our framework, goods are produced with tasks using
assignment rules (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001; Costinot and Vogel 2010;
Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Production involves different tasks, such as manag-
ing, output, and design, and maintenance services. Exporters and nonexporters
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fill managerial tasks with skilled workers and fill maintenance services tasks with
unskilled workers. However, output and design can be performed by engineers
or by blue-collar workers. Engineers can deliver higher quality goods than blue-
collar workers because they are more efficient in input supervision, assembly,
and general product attributes that determine quality (Bernard and Jensen 1997;
Yeaple 2005; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Verhoogen 2008; Brambilla,
Lederman, and Porto 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen 2012; Bustos 2014; Bastos,
Silva and Verhoogen 2014; Caron, Fally and Markusen, 2014). For given factor
prices, more productive firms can afford to enter export markets, choose to
produce on average higher quality products, and hire on average a higher share
of engineers relative to blue-collar workers than less productive, nonexporting
firms.
To test these predictions, the empirical analysis exploits detailed information
of firms demand for different tasks contained in the Chilean Encuesta Nacional
Industrial Anual (ENIA). The results from an instrumental variable estimator
show that Chilean exporters indeed utilize a higher share of engineers over blue-
collar workers than nonexporting firms. The results provide causal evidence of
the skilled tasks demanded by exporters relative to nonexporters in Chile.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 sketches a simple
model of exports, quality, and the demand for engineers and blue-collar
workers. Section 2 discusses the main empirical results. Section 3 concludes.
I . A MODE L O F EX POR T S , ENG I N E E R S , A ND BL U E - WORK ER S
We combine elements from Verhoogen (2008) with elements from Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) in a simple partial equilibriummodel
of exports and employment composition. From Verhoogen (2008), we adopt the
theoretical framework underlying the idea that exporting requires quality upgrades
that are inherently intensive in skilled labor. This framework can also be found in
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2012), Brambilla
and Porto (2016), and Bastos, Silva and Verhoogen (2014). From Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) and Costinot and Vogel (2010), we adopt an assignment model of
skills to tasks. In this setting, quality for exports is produced with a collection of
tasks that can be performed by workers with different skills. Exporting firms
assign higher skilled workers such as engineers to fundamentally similar tasks to
achieve higher quality. As a consequence, exporting firms hire a higher share of
engineers over blue-collar workers than nonexporters.
We adopt a multinomial logit demand framework. The aggregate demand
function of product jwith quality u and price p is
xjð pj; ujÞ ¼ expðauj  pjÞ; ð1Þ
where a captures quality valuation which, as in Verhoogen (2008), is higher for
exporting firms.
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Firms produce differentiated products in monopolistically-competitive
markets. Firms can choose the level of vertical differentiation of their products u.
This depends, ceteris paribus, on the quality valuation parameter a. This gives
firms the option to provide more vertical differentiation to export markets with
higher a. Exporting, in turn, incurs a fixed cost Fx.
As in Verhoogen (2008), production of output of quality u requires activities to
produce physical units and activities to produce quality itself. We assume that the
production of quantity (physical units of output) is separated from the production
of quality. Firms produce quantity and quality with tasks (Acemoglu and Autor
2011). To simplify the exposition, we assume that there are three different types of
tasks: maintenance services (cleaning, machine and building maintenance), pro-
duction and design (production activities, accounting, packaging, marketing, engi-
neering, logistics, input control, supervision), and managerial activities (firm
direction). We refer to these tasks as task 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In turn, tasks
are produced by either skilled or unskilled workers which earn wages wH and wL,
withwH . wL.
Regarding quantity production, following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), tasks
provide services that generate output. Letting y be the task services, output x is:
x ¼ exp
X3
i¼1
axðiÞ ln yxðiÞ
 !
; ð2Þ
where yxðiÞ, with i¼1,2,3, is the service of tasks i, and axðiÞ are the
Cobb-Douglas parameters that capture the intensity of task i. The production
function has constant return to scale, axð1Þ þ axð2Þ þ axð3Þ ¼ 1. The produc-
tion function of task services yxðiÞ is Ricardian. The productivity of unskilled
and skilled labor in task i is aLxðiÞ and aHxðiÞ, respectively. We rank tasks in in-
creasing order of skill intensity so that task 1 is the most unskilled intensive task,
while task 3 is the most skilled intensive task. To determine the assignment of
skills to tasks, we assume that wages are exogenous to the firm. The unit cost of
using unskilled labor in task i is thus wL=aLxðiÞ, and the unit cost of using skilled
labor is wH=aHxðiÞ. These assumptions imply that wages of unskilled and skilled
workers are the same across tasks, but the workers’ productivity is not.
Without loss of generality, we consider a scenario where wages and productiv-
ity are such that
aHxð1Þ
aLxð1Þ ,
aHxð2Þ
aLxð2Þ ,
wH
wL
,
aHxð3Þ
aLxð3Þ : ð3Þ
This assumption implies that, in output production activities, firms allocate un-
skilled workers to tasks 1 and 2 and skilled workers to task 3. Given constant
factor prices and labor productivity, these allocations deliver a cost function of
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output which features constant returns to scale. The marginal cost function is
c ¼ cðwL;wHÞ; ð4Þ
which depends on factor prices (and technology), but it is independent of the
quantity (and quality) produced.1
Turning to the technology to produce quality, we assume that the production
of quality requires the same collection of services produced by tasks 1 to 3 as in
output production. The production function of quality is
u ¼ l exp
X3
i¼1
auðiÞ ln yuðiÞ
 !b
; ð5Þ
where l is firm productivity in quality production. Firms differ in l and these dif-
ferences allow firms to select themselves into exporters and nonexporters and,
within exporters, to define their export intensity (the share of exports in sales).
To achieve an interior solution, we assume that b , 1 so that the production
function exhibits decreasing returns to scale and the marginal cost of quality pro-
duction is increasing.2
The production function of task services yu is also Ricardian, with productivi-
ty aLuðiÞ and aHuðiÞ, ¼1,2,3. Again, without loss of generality, consider a sce-
nario where wages and productivity are such that
aHuð1Þ
aLuð1Þ ,
wH
wL
,
aHuð2Þ
aLuð2Þ ,
aHuð3Þ
aLuð3Þ : ð6Þ
This assumption implies that, in quality production activities, firms allocate un-
skilled workers to task 1 but skilled workers to tasks 2 and 3.
Our interpretation of these assumptions is as follows. Production of output and
quality require similar tasks. In basic tasks such as cleaning, janitorial services,
maintenance operations and so on, firms hire similar types of unskilled workers
both in output and quality production. In more sophisticated tasks such as mana-
gerial services or firm direction, firms hire similar types of skilled workers in
all firm activities. The firm’s sales director has similar skills as the design director.
The difference is in task 2, operations and designs. In the production of
1. This result, which is a consequence of the assumption that the production of quantity and quality
are independent, simplifies the solution of the model, but it is not strictly necessary for our conclusions.
Extensions where the marginal cost of quantity production depends on quality can be found in Verhoogen
(2008), Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2012), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and Bastos, Silva, and
Verhoogen (2014). See, e.g., the review in Brambilla and Porto (2016).
2. This assumption guarantees that the choice of quality is bounded. A similar assumption is in
Verhoogen (2008).
S129Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
ber/article-abstract/30/Supplem
ent_1/S126/2897399 by guest on 04 Septem
ber 2019
physical output, firms hire blue-collar workers; in the production of quality, firms
hire engineers.
A key difference between output and quality production is the structure of the
cost function. While output production is subject to constant marginal cost c,
quality production features increasing marginal costs. The total cost function is:
F ¼ Fðu; l;wL;wHÞ: ð7Þ
Given the production function for u, equation (6), F0u . 0 and F
00
u . 0. That is,
the marginal cost of producing quality is positive and increasing in the level of
quality. We also know that F0l , 0 and that @F
0
u=@l , 0 (the marginal cost of
producing quality decreases with productivity). Note also that, given optimal
quality, the production of quality is independent of the sales of physical units of
the good. In this sense, F is a fixed costs (in terms of x).
Having determined the technology of producing physical units and quality, we
can now study firm choices of quality and price to maximize profits (net of fixed
costs), p ¼ ð p cÞxð p; uÞ  FðuÞ. The first order conditions are
p ¼ 1þ c; ð8Þ
axð p; uÞ ¼ F0ðuÞ: ð9Þ
In this setting, firms charge the same price for goods of any quality. This price is
a markup over the marginal cost c (given by (4)).3 Since it is costly to produce
quality, vertical differentiation occurs because firms can sell higher quantities of
higher-quality products. The optimal choice of quality u is determined by the
equality of the marginal cost (F0ðuÞ) and the marginal benefit (higher sales mea-
sured by axð p; uÞ) of quality provision.4 Since @F0u=@l , 0, optimal quality in-
creases with the productivity of the firm.
To derive the demand for different types of workers, consider a firm with pro-
ductivity l that chooses a good of quality u.5 For the lowest skill tasks, task 1, only
unskilled workers are utilized, both for output production and for quality produc-
tion. Total unskilled utilization is Lð1Þ ¼ axð1Þðp 1Þx=wL þ auð1ÞFðuÞ=wL:
For the highest skill tasks, task 3, only skilled workers are utilized. Total skilled
utilization is Hð3Þ ¼ axð3Þðp 1Þx=wH þ auð3ÞFðuÞ=wH. For intermediate tasks,
task 2, unskilled workers are utilized in output production and skilled workers in
quality production. This can refer to an engineer, who monitors production,
and a blue-collar worker, that operates machines. Unskilled utilization is
3. The result that firms charge the same price for goods of different qualities is probably unrealistic,
but it is a simplification that allows us to easily illustrate the implications of productivity and of exporting
on the demands of skilled tasks. See Brambilla and Porto (2016) for alternative modeling strategies.
4. For an interior solution, we assume that the marginal cost increases in u at a sufficiently high rate
(concretely, the second order condition for profit maximization is F00ðuÞ . a2xð p; uÞ).
5. For a detailed derivation of factor demands, see Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2015).
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Lð2Þ ¼ axð2Þðp 1Þx=wL, while skilled utilization is Hð2Þ ¼ auð2ÞFðuÞ=wH. To
streamline the exposition and assess the empirical implications, we focus on the
ratio of engineers to blue-collar workers:
rðuÞ ¼ Hð2Þ
Lð2Þ ¼
auð2Þ
axð2Þ
FðuÞ=wH
ð p 1Þx=wL ð10Þ
Wewant to establish whether there are differences in r between firms, in particu-
lar between exporters and nonexporters. Firms differ in l, quality productivity,
and more productive firms choose to sell higher quality goods. A firm can sepa-
rately choose a quality to sell domestically and a quality to sell abroad. As in
the literature, export markets have a higher quality valuation (a higher a in the
demand function (1) and demand higher quality. In the spirit of Verhoogen
(2008), Figure 1 illustrates the model. The right panel of the figure plots the posi-
tive relationship between productivity l and quality u. The curve AA depicts the
profile of domestic quality chosen by firms of varying l. The curve BB, which
depicts the profile in foreign markets, shifts up because of higher quality valua-
tion abroad. There is a fixed cost of exporting and a (lower) fixed cost of entering
the domestic market. This gives rise to two productivity cutoffs. Let lmin be the
cutoff productivity to enter domestic markets and lexp be the cutoff productivity
of exporters. The solid curve shows the profile of average quality as a function of
FIGURE 1. Productivity, Quality, Engineers and Blue-collar Workers
Notes: Right-Panel: firm productivity and optimal quality. The curve AA depicts the profile of
domestic quality; the curve BB depicts the profile in foreign markets. lmin and lexp are the entry
cutoffs into domestic and export markets, respectively. The solid curve shows the profile of average
quality.
Left-Panel: optimal quality and the ratio of engineers to blue-collar workers in employment. The
curve AA corresponds to the ratio utilized in the production for the domestic market and the curve
BB, to the ratio utilized in the production for foreign markets. The solid curves depict the average
ratio for different firms.
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productivity. Average quality jumps at the exporting cutoff and increases steadily
with l. On average, exporters produce higher quality products than nonexport-
ers. In addition, within exporters, firms with higher productivity l will ship a
larger share of their sales abroad and will produce even higher quality output.
Consider now a more productive firm (i.e., a firm with a higher l) that chooses
to produce a higher quality u. It is easy to show that r is increasing in u at a de-
creasing rate.6 On the left panel of figure 1, we plot the relationship between the
ratio of engineers to blue-collar workers and quality. The curve AA corresponds
to the ratio utilized in the production for the domestic market. The curve BB is
the ratio utilized in the production for foreign markets. BB lies above AA
because, for a given quality, foreign markets with higher quality valuation also
demand higher quantities. The solid curve depicts the average r for different
firms. As it can be seen, there is a jump in r at the quality exporting cutoff.
Exporters produce on average higher quality products and, consequently, hire on
average a higher share and a higher ratio of engineers to blue-collar workers.
I I . E V I D EN C E
We use two sources of data, firm-level data, and customs records. The firm-level
data come from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual in-
dustrial census run by Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica that interviews all
manufacturing plants with 10 workers or more. It is a panel. The customs data
provide administrative records on firms exports by destination. We manually
matched both databases for the period 2001–2005. As a result, we built a 5-year
panel database of Chilean manufacturing firms.
The data have several modules. The main module contains information on in-
dustry affiliation, ownership type, sales, exports, input use, imports of materials,
workers and wages. Industry affiliation is defined at the 4-digit ISIC Revision 3
level, which totals 113 industries.
We are mostly interested in the employment information. The data on
workers are presented at detailed categories, which allows us to explore the
demand for different tasks. From the detailed employment records, we define the
following tasks: management (directors), administrative services (accountants,
lawyers), engineers (specialized skilled production workers), blue-collar activities
(nonspecialized unskilled production workers), and general maintenance services
(unskilled nonproduction workers).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the key variables in our model. We
present the unconditional averages as well as averages for exporting firms and
nonexporting firms. In terms of employment, exporters are larger than nonex-
porters, as expected. On average, 39 percent of workers in Chilean firms are
skilled workers and 61 percent are unskilled workers. Exporters utilize a higher
6. Note that since the production functions are Cobb-Douglas, the parameters ax and au are fixed
and, in particular, do not depend on the x or u.
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share of skilled workers (41 percent) than nonexporters (39 percent). Within the
skilled and unskilled categories, we are especially interested in engineering and
blue-collar employment. The share of engineering employment is roughly 18.1
percent at both at exporters and nonexporters, while the share of blue-collar em-
ployment is 52.0 and 54.6 at exporters and nonexporters, respectively. The ratio
of engineers to blue-collar workers is 4.7 at exporters and 2.1 at nonexporters.
Finally, the average exporter ships around 32 percent of its sales abroad. Among
all firms, exports accounts for only 5 percent of total firm sales.
To formally study the relationship between exporting and the composition of
employment, we work with the following regression model
yijt ¼ gEijt þ x0ijtbþ fi þ f jt þ 1ijt; ð11Þ
where i is a firm, t is time, and j is an industry. Outcomes are denoted by yijt and
export intensity (the ratio of exports to total sales) is Eijt. We add a vector x,
which includes firm level variables such as log total employment and initial con-
ditions (sales and exporting status) interacted with year dummies to account for
firm-specific trends. The regression includes firm fixed effects, fi and industry
year effects, f jt.
To estimate causal effects, we instrument Eijt following a strategy similar to
Park et al. (2010), Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2012), Bastos, Silva, and
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics National Annual Industrial Survey Chile
2001–2005
All firms Exporters Nonexporters
A) Skilled and unskilled labor
Log skilled employment 2.37 2.47 2.36
Log unskilled employment 2.88 2.88 2.87
Share skilled employment 38.7 40.6 38.5
Share unskilled employment 61.3 59.5 61.5
B) Tasks
Log managerial employment 0.60 0.79 0.58
Log engineering employment 1.22 1.36 1.21
Log services employment 1.22 1.34 1.21
Log blue-collar employment 2.71 2.72 2.71
Log maintenance employment 0.46 0.48 0.46
Share managerial employment 7.2 8.7 7.0
Share engineering employment 18.8 18.2 18.8
Share services employment 12.7 13.8 12.7
Share blue-collar employment 54.4 52.0 54.6
Share maintenance employment 6.9 7.3 6.9
Ratio engineers/blue-collar 2.5 4.7 2.1
C) Exports
Exports/sales 0.05 0.32 0.00
Source: averages calculated from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual
Industrial Survey), Chile 2001–2005.
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Verhoogen (2014), and Brambilla and Porto (2016), among others. Intuitively,
exogenous export opportunities for a firm are likely to arise when foreign
demand expands and this will happen when exchange-rate variations make
Chilean exports relatively cheaper. Given these exogenous changes, a firm will be
more likely to take advantage of these export opportunities if it is exposed to
those markets. A natural measure of destination exposure in this case is the share
of a firm’s exports to that destination in total firm sales. As in Brambilla,
Lederman, and Porto (2012), we also interact this variable with initial firm sales
(i.e., log sales in 2001) to include any firm advantages in profiting from export
opportunities based on firm size. To assess the power of these instruments, we
can look at the first stage results. These are reported in panel A of table 2 for four
specifications. In column 1, the specification includes only firm fixed-effects and
year-effects. The instruments work well and have high explanatory power. In
column 2, we add log employment to control for size. This means we compare
TABLE 2. Exports, Engineers, and Blue-collar Workers IV Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) First stage Results
Average real exchange rate 20.149*** 20.148*** 20.149*** 20.149***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Average real exchange rate *initial sales 20.0029* 20.0030* 20.0029* 20.0029*
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016)
R2 0.4129 0.4147 0.4144 0.4146
F-statistic 888.09 882.96 888.42 884.31
Prob .F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B) Tasks
Share managers 20.01** 20.01 20.01 20.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share engineers 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Share services 20.009 0.009 0.009 20.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Share blue-collar 20.07** 20.08** 20.08** 20.08**
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Share maintenance 20.01** 20.01* 20.01* 20.01*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ratio engineers to blue-collar 14.42** 13.54** 13.67** 13.58**
(6.34) (6.13) (6.37) (6.33)
Firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes yes
Log employment No Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes
Firm-specific trends No No No Yes
Notes: IV-FE regressions of employment shares on export intensity (exports/sales). The instru-
ments are the weighted average the real exchange rate of a firm export partners and the weighted
average of the real gdp of a firm export destinations. Column (1): firm fixed-effects and year
fixed-effects; column (2): adds log total employment (firm size); column (3): adds controls for
industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between year dummies and industry dummies); column
(4): adds initial conditions to control for firm-specific trends. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional
Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001–2005.
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firms of equal size, with different export intensity. To account for industry
trends, such as industry-specific growth processes, we add in column 3 interac-
tions between year dummies and industry dummies. In column 4, we also add
initial conditions to account for firm-specific trends (Brambilla, Lederman, and
Porto 2012). The results are very robust and the magnitudes of the coefficients
are also stable across specifications.
The causal impacts of export intensity on employment are reported in panel B
of table 2. We find that the share of engineering employment is higher among ex-
porters. This holds for all our specifications, that is, conditional on firm- and
year-fixed effects only (column 1), conditional on size and fixed effects (column
2), and also conditional on industry- and firm-specific trends (columns 3 and 4).
Evaluated at the average share of export sales, conditional on exporting (32
percent in our data), an exporter hires 3.2 percentage points more engineers than
a nonexporter. This is compensated with lower shares of blue-collar employ-
ment. The shares of all other types of employment are not statistically different,
except for the share of maintenance workers, which is only marginally smaller
among exporting firms. These results can also be seen in terms of the ratio of en-
gineers to blue-collar works. In all four specifications, the ratio increases with
exports. These findings are consistent with our theory.
I I I . CONC L U S I O N S
Chilean exporters demand more engineers relative to blue-collar workers.
Foreign consumers value product quality and quality is intensive in engineering
tasks. A simple partial equilibrium model formalized these mechanisms and
the evidence from a panel of Chilean firms supports the model predictions.
The findings have implications for empirical research and policy design. The
notion that trade, and exports in particular, affects the wage premium and thus
wage-inequality needs to be carefully assessed. Exporting from developing coun-
tries may raise the demand for specific sets of skills, thus creating potential in-
equality even within skilled labor categories. In Chile, our results show that
export opportunities boost the demand for technical skills such as engineering
skills. These conclusions should contribute to our understanding of the skilled
tasks needed for exports, the role of potential education policies consistent with
a successful long-run export performance, and the design of social policies to
reduce wage inequality and help the losers from trade.
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